JDK 11 java.base.jmod - Base Module
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⏎ java/lang/RuntimePermission.java
/*
* Copyright (c) 1997, 2017, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
* ORACLE PROPRIETARY/CONFIDENTIAL. Use is subject to license terms.
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package java.lang;
import java.security.*;
import java.lang.module.ModuleFinder;
/**
* This class is for runtime permissions. A {@code RuntimePermission}
* contains a name (also referred to as a "target name") but no actions
* list; you either have the named permission or you don't.
* <p>
* The target name is the name of the runtime permission (see below). The
* naming convention follows the hierarchical property naming convention.
* Also, an asterisk may appear at the end of the name, following a ".",
* or by itself, to signify a wildcard match. For example: "loadLibrary.*"
* and "*" signify a wildcard match, while "*loadLibrary" and "a*b" do not.
* <p>
* The following table lists the standard {@code RuntimePermission}
* target names, and for each provides a description of what the permission
* allows and a discussion of the risks of granting code the permission.
*
* <table class="striped">
* <caption style="display:none">permission target name,
* what the target allows, and associated risks</caption>
* <thead>
* <tr>
* <th scope="col">Permission Target Name</th>
* <th scope="col">What the Permission Allows</th>
* <th scope="col">Risks of Allowing this Permission</th>
* </tr>
* </thead>
* <tbody>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">createClassLoader</th>
* <td>Creation of a class loader</td>
* <td>This is an extremely dangerous permission to grant.
* Malicious applications that can instantiate their own class
* loaders could then load their own rogue classes into the system.
* These newly loaded classes could be placed into any protection
* domain by the class loader, thereby automatically granting the
* classes the permissions for that domain.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">getClassLoader</th>
* <td>Retrieval of a class loader (e.g., the class loader for the calling
* class)</td>
* <td>This would grant an attacker permission to get the
* class loader for a particular class. This is dangerous because
* having access to a class's class loader allows the attacker to
* load other classes available to that class loader. The attacker
* would typically otherwise not have access to those classes.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">setContextClassLoader</th>
* <td>Setting of the context class loader used by a thread</td>
* <td>The context class loader is used by system code and extensions
* when they need to lookup resources that might not exist in the system
* class loader. Granting setContextClassLoader permission would allow
* code to change which context class loader is used
* for a particular thread, including system threads.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">enableContextClassLoaderOverride</th>
* <td>Subclass implementation of the thread context class loader methods</td>
* <td>The context class loader is used by system code and extensions
* when they need to lookup resources that might not exist in the system
* class loader. Granting enableContextClassLoaderOverride permission would allow
* a subclass of Thread to override the methods that are used
* to get or set the context class loader for a particular thread.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">closeClassLoader</th>
* <td>Closing of a ClassLoader</td>
* <td>Granting this permission allows code to close any URLClassLoader
* that it has a reference to.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">setSecurityManager</th>
* <td>Setting of the security manager (possibly replacing an existing one)
* </td>
* <td>The security manager is a class that allows
* applications to implement a security policy. Granting the setSecurityManager
* permission would allow code to change which security manager is used by
* installing a different, possibly less restrictive security manager,
* thereby bypassing checks that would have been enforced by the original
* security manager.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">createSecurityManager</th>
* <td>Creation of a new security manager</td>
* <td>This gives code access to protected, sensitive methods that may
* disclose information about other classes or the execution stack.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">getenv.{variable name}</th>
* <td>Reading of the value of the specified environment variable</td>
* <td>This would allow code to read the value, or determine the
* existence, of a particular environment variable. This is
* dangerous if the variable contains confidential data.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">exitVM.{exit status}</th>
* <td>Halting of the Java Virtual Machine with the specified exit status</td>
* <td>This allows an attacker to mount a denial-of-service attack
* by automatically forcing the virtual machine to halt.
* Note: The "exitVM.*" permission is automatically granted to all code
* loaded from the application class path, thus enabling applications
* to terminate themselves. Also, the "exitVM" permission is equivalent to
* "exitVM.*".</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">shutdownHooks</th>
* <td>Registration and cancellation of virtual-machine shutdown hooks</td>
* <td>This allows an attacker to register a malicious shutdown
* hook that interferes with the clean shutdown of the virtual machine.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">setFactory</th>
* <td>Setting of the socket factory used by ServerSocket or Socket,
* or of the stream handler factory used by URL</td>
* <td>This allows code to set the actual implementation
* for the socket, server socket, stream handler, or RMI socket factory.
* An attacker may set a faulty implementation which mangles the data
* stream.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">setIO</th>
* <td>Setting of System.out, System.in, and System.err</td>
* <td>This allows changing the value of the standard system streams.
* An attacker may change System.in to monitor and
* steal user input, or may set System.err to a "null" OutputStream,
* which would hide any error messages sent to System.err. </td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">modifyThread</th>
* <td>Modification of threads, e.g., via calls to Thread
* {@code interrupt, stop, suspend, resume, setDaemon, setPriority,
* setName} and {@code setUncaughtExceptionHandler}
* methods</td>
* <td>This allows an attacker to modify the behaviour of
* any thread in the system.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">stopThread</th>
* <td>Stopping of threads via calls to the Thread <code>stop</code>
* method</td>
* <td>This allows code to stop any thread in the system provided that it is
* already granted permission to access that thread.
* This poses as a threat, because that code may corrupt the system by
* killing existing threads.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">modifyThreadGroup</th>
* <td>modification of thread groups, e.g., via calls to ThreadGroup
* <code>destroy</code>, <code>getParent</code>, <code>resume</code>,
* <code>setDaemon</code>, <code>setMaxPriority</code>, <code>stop</code>,
* and <code>suspend</code> methods</td>
* <td>This allows an attacker to create thread groups and
* set their run priority.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">getProtectionDomain</th>
* <td>Retrieval of the ProtectionDomain for a class</td>
* <td>This allows code to obtain policy information
* for a particular code source. While obtaining policy information
* does not compromise the security of the system, it does give
* attackers additional information, such as local file names for
* example, to better aim an attack.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">getFileSystemAttributes</th>
* <td>Retrieval of file system attributes</td>
* <td>This allows code to obtain file system information such as disk usage
* or disk space available to the caller. This is potentially dangerous
* because it discloses information about the system hardware
* configuration and some information about the caller's privilege to
* write files.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">readFileDescriptor</th>
* <td>Reading of file descriptors</td>
* <td>This would allow code to read the particular file associated
* with the file descriptor read. This is dangerous if the file
* contains confidential data.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">writeFileDescriptor</th>
* <td>Writing to file descriptors</td>
* <td>This allows code to write to a particular file associated
* with the descriptor. This is dangerous because it may allow
* malicious code to plant viruses or at the very least, fill up
* your entire disk.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">loadLibrary.{library name}</th>
* <td>Dynamic linking of the specified library</td>
* <td>It is dangerous to allow an applet permission to load native code
* libraries, because the Java security architecture is not designed to and
* does not prevent malicious behavior at the level of native code.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">accessClassInPackage.{package name}</th>
* <td>Access to the specified package via a class loader's
* <code>loadClass</code> method when that class loader calls
* the SecurityManager <code>checkPackageAccess</code> method</td>
* <td>This gives code access to classes in packages
* to which it normally does not have access. Malicious code
* may use these classes to help in its attempt to compromise
* security in the system.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">defineClassInPackage.{package name}</th>
* <td>Definition of classes in the specified package, via a class
* loader's <code>defineClass</code> method when that class loader calls
* the SecurityManager <code>checkPackageDefinition</code> method.</td>
* <td>This grants code permission to define a class
* in a particular package. This is dangerous because malicious
* code with this permission may define rogue classes in
* trusted packages like <code>java.security</code> or <code>java.lang</code>,
* for example.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">defineClass</th>
* <td>Define a class with
* {@link java.lang.invoke.MethodHandles.Lookup#defineClass(byte[])
* Lookup.defineClass}.</td>
* <td>This grants code with a suitably privileged {@code Lookup} object
* permission to define classes in the same package as the {@code Lookup}'s
* lookup class. </td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">accessDeclaredMembers</th>
* <td>Access to the declared members of a class</td>
* <td>This grants code permission to query a class for its public,
* protected, default (package) access, and private fields and/or
* methods. Although the code would have
* access to the private and protected field and method names, it would not
* have access to the private/protected field data and would not be able
* to invoke any private methods. Nevertheless, malicious code
* may use this information to better aim an attack.
* Additionally, it may invoke any public methods and/or access public fields
* in the class. This could be dangerous if
* the code would normally not be able to invoke those methods and/or
* access the fields because
* it can't cast the object to the class/interface with those methods
* and fields.
</td>
* </tr>
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">queuePrintJob</th>
* <td>Initiation of a print job request</td>
* <td>This could print sensitive information to a printer,
* or simply waste paper.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">getStackTrace</th>
* <td>Retrieval of the stack trace information of another thread.</td>
* <td>This allows retrieval of the stack trace information of
* another thread. This might allow malicious code to monitor the
* execution of threads and discover vulnerabilities in applications.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">getStackWalkerWithClassReference</th>
* <td>Get a stack walker that can retrieve stack frames with class reference.</td>
* <td>This allows retrieval of Class objects from stack walking.
* This might allow malicious code to access Class objects on the stack
* outside its own context.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">setDefaultUncaughtExceptionHandler</th>
* <td>Setting the default handler to be used when a thread
* terminates abruptly due to an uncaught exception</td>
* <td>This allows an attacker to register a malicious
* uncaught exception handler that could interfere with termination
* of a thread</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">preferences</th>
* <td>Represents the permission required to get access to the
* java.util.prefs.Preferences implementations user or system root
* which in turn allows retrieval or update operations within the
* Preferences persistent backing store.) </td>
* <td>This permission allows the user to read from or write to the
* preferences backing store if the user running the code has
* sufficient OS privileges to read/write to that backing store.
* The actual backing store may reside within a traditional filesystem
* directory or within a registry depending on the platform OS</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">manageProcess</th>
* <td>Native process termination and information about processes
* {@link ProcessHandle}.</td>
* <td>Allows code to identify and terminate processes that it did not create.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">localeServiceProvider</th>
* <td>This {@code RuntimePermission} is required to be granted to
* classes which subclass and implement
* {@code java.util.spi.LocaleServiceProvider}. The permission is
* checked during invocation of the abstract base class constructor.
* This permission ensures trust in classes which implement this
* security-sensitive provider mechanism. </td>
* <td>See <a href= "../util/spi/LocaleServiceProvider.html">
* {@code java.util.spi.LocaleServiceProvider}</a> for more
* information.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">loggerFinder</th>
* <td>This {@code RuntimePermission} is required to be granted to
* classes which subclass or call methods on
* {@code java.lang.System.LoggerFinder}. The permission is
* checked during invocation of the abstract base class constructor, as
* well as on the invocation of its public methods.
* This permission ensures trust in classes which provide loggers
* to system classes.</td>
* <td>See {@link java.lang.System.LoggerFinder java.lang.System.LoggerFinder}
* for more information.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <th scope="row">accessSystemModules</th>
* <td>Access system modules in the runtime image.</td>
* <td>This grants the permission to access resources in the
* {@linkplain ModuleFinder#ofSystem system modules} in the runtime image.</td>
* </tr>
*
* </tbody>
* </table>
*
* @implNote
* Implementations may define additional target names, but should use naming
* conventions such as reverse domain name notation to avoid name clashes.
*
* @see java.security.BasicPermission
* @see java.security.Permission
* @see java.security.Permissions
* @see java.security.PermissionCollection
* @see java.lang.SecurityManager
*
*
* @author Marianne Mueller
* @author Roland Schemers
* @since 1.2
*/
public final class RuntimePermission extends BasicPermission {
private static final long serialVersionUID = 7399184964622342223L;
/**
* Creates a new RuntimePermission with the specified name.
* The name is the symbolic name of the RuntimePermission, such as
* "exit", "setFactory", etc. An asterisk
* may appear at the end of the name, following a ".", or by itself, to
* signify a wildcard match.
*
* @param name the name of the RuntimePermission.
*
* @throws NullPointerException if <code>name</code> is <code>null</code>.
* @throws IllegalArgumentException if <code>name</code> is empty.
*/
public RuntimePermission(String name)
{
super(name);
}
/**
* Creates a new RuntimePermission object with the specified name.
* The name is the symbolic name of the RuntimePermission, and the
* actions String is currently unused and should be null.
*
* @param name the name of the RuntimePermission.
* @param actions should be null.
*
* @throws NullPointerException if <code>name</code> is <code>null</code>.
* @throws IllegalArgumentException if <code>name</code> is empty.
*/
public RuntimePermission(String name, String actions)
{
super(name, actions);
}
}
⏎ java/lang/RuntimePermission.java
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